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3
The Once (But No Longer) 
Golden Age of Human Capital
Nancy Folbre
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Human capital remains both a valuable concept and a valuable 
commodity. However, both its theoretical incarnation and its economic 
value are losing some of their shine. In this chapter, I will explain why, 
emphasizing recent reversals both in the way economists think about 
human capital and in the evidence that its accumulation will continue 
to deliver rich rewards. My account begins as an exercise in intellectual 
history, goes on to argue that the U.S. economy is shifting from a regime 
of excess demand for college-educated workers to a regime of excess 
supply, then speculates on how such trends might affect both patterns 
of and political responses to the resulting increased income inequality. 
One could examine the history of human capital theory from many 
vantage points. I focus here on the way in which the theory comple-
mented the view that markets operate in both effi cient and equitable 
ways. This does not imply that the theory can be reduced to an ideology, 
nor that it was intended as an ideological construct, but simply that it 
conformed to a set of principles that have been described as “belief in 
a just world” (Lerner 1980). I use the past tense here for good reason: 
both the evolution of ideas about human capital theory and the market 
rewards for it have undermined its initial ideological impact. That is, 
many current interpretations of human capital theory—as well as cur-
rent empirical trends—lead toward the conclusion that individuals are 
not necessarily fairly rewarded for their efforts.
One could examine returns to investments in human capital in 
a variety of ways. I focus here on rates of return to a college educa-
tion, examining factors relevant to both the supply of and demand for 
college-educated workers on the national and the global level. Rather 
than mobilizing new data, I summarize existing research showing that 
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absolute rates of return to private investments in college degrees have 
declined, even though relative rates—expected earnings compared 
to those of workers without a college degree—have remained attrac-
tive. Neither private nor public investments in higher education have 
expanded as much in recent years as one might expect, given this per-
sistent college premium. I offer an explanation based on shifts in both 
the demand for the skills that higher education develops and the global 
supply of college graduates. I also predict a signifi cant constriction of 
opportunities for all but a relatively small subset of college-educated 
workers in the near future. 
This constriction has probably already intensifi ed inequality in the 
United States between those in the top decile of the earnings distribu-
tion and everyone else, though it seems unlikely that it has affected the 
relative earnings of the top 1 percent relative to others in the top tenth. 
A less explored but perhaps politically more important question is how 
it will affect earnings inequality between those with and those without 
college degrees, who are currently located at very different ends of the 
so-called “middle” class. If a declining rate of return on a college educa-
tion diminishes the average economic distance between the median col-
lege graduate and the median high-school graduate, it could lead to the 
emergence of new political coalitions. Depending on how one defi nes 
the “working class,” that group may be increasing both in relative num-
bers and in relative credentials. Changes in returns to college could also 
complicate the impact of race and ethnicity, diminishing the advan-
tage that young white non-Hispanics have accrued from their superior 
access to educational credentials. In general, diminishing rewards to 
higher education, combined with slow economic growth, may under-
mine the confi dence in upward mobility through “self-investment” that 
characterized the golden age of human capital. 
A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
In 1964, Gary Becker published a book with the simple title Human 
Capital. Neither the basic concept nor the phrase was novel (Folbre 
2009). But the Beckerian version—complemented by the convergent 
insights of Jacob Mincer and Reuben Gronau—quickly gained adher-
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ents for two reasons: it was 1) methodologically consistent with the 
mainstream emphasis on individual choice and 2) easily adaptable for 
detailed econometric analysis. Becker’s book laid the foundation for the 
subsequent development of his Treatise on the Family, widely consid-
ered a masterpiece of modern microeconomics. 
Placed in historical context, the rise of human capital theory repre-
sented an important new episode in an ongoing ideological drama. Clas-
sical political economy pointed to signifi cant confl ict between capital 
and labor. Both Ricardian and Marxian theories treated profi ts as a form 
of surplus essentially expropriated from workers. Even the neoclassi-
cal theories that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century treated 
profi ts above and beyond the cost of capital and entrepreneurship as a 
rent that would, under perfect competition, be competed away to zero. 
John Bates Clark and Philip Henry Wicksteed offered a more pointed 
justifi cation for factor payments by developing a more specifi c theory 
of distribution, arguing that wages represented the marginal product of 
labor, just as profi ts represented the marginal product of capital. The 
normative implications were clear: each factor of production was remu-
nerated according to its contribution. 
Still, the theory of marginal productivity clearly shows that an indi-
vidual worker’s wages can be adversely affected by circumstances com-
pletely outside of her or his control. An increase in the supply of labor 
drives down the equilibrium wage. Firms will hire more workers, but 
the fact that the marginal worker is paid for her or his marginal prod-
uct offers little consolation to the average worker who experiences a 
drop in living standards. The greater the prospect of labor market trends 
that may worsen the position of workers, the greater the incentive to 
collectively organize in ways that might prevent an overall increase in 
labor supply. One conspicuous manifestation of such collective efforts 
is strict limits on immigration (a subject to which this chapter will later 
return). 
The theory of human capital offers a much stronger ethical justifi -
cation for wages by emphasizing the link between the quality of labor 
supplied and the wage earned. Indeed, the notion that a worker’s skills 
represent an animate form of capital elides the very distinction between 
capital and labor as factors of production. It also implies a far more 
egalitarian distribution of assets than one based on ownership of fi nan-
cial capital alone. As the journalist Noah Smith put it, “For most of 
Ch3Folbre.indd   35 11/4/2016   12:46:41 PM
36   Folbre
modern history, inequality has been a manageable problem. The reason 
is that no matter how unequal things get, most people are born with 
something valuable: the ability to work, to learn, and to earn money”
(Smith 2013).
The fi rst generation of human capital models designed for econo-
metric analysis treated earnings as a function of education and experi-
ence, controlling for other factors. Under these models, everyone is a 
capitalist with the potential to make investments in her or his own pro-
ductive skills that will pay off in increased future earnings. The theory 
effectively diverted attention from the earlier problem of class con-
fl ict by emphasizing differences among workers, rather than between 
workers and owners. In other words, it primarily offered an explana-
tion of relative wages (why some earned more than others) rather than 
an explanation of the absolute level of wages. Changes in productivity 
drop out of the picture except insofar as technological change might 
affect the rate of return to specifi c skills. 
This new emphasis was particularly well suited to an era in which 
higher education in the United States was rapidly expanding, along 
with opportunities for professional and managerial employment. In the 
1960s, a college degree became a ticket to ride on a train that was rap-
idly gaining momentum. Nor were neoclassical economists the only 
ones turning their attention to differences among “workers.” Both jour-
nalists and sociologists infl uenced by Marxian political economy soon 
began to explore the meaning of a professional-managerial class occu-
pying an intermediate position between labor and capital—similar, in 
that respect, to the older category of petite bourgeoisie or owners of 
small businesses (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979). 
The human capital approach also provided a timely framework for 
understanding earnings inequalities based on race and gender, just as 
these inequalities were provoking new forms of political mobilization. 
The presumption that individual earnings are determined by education 
and experience invited consideration of “unexplained” variation as a 
measure of discrimination. In Becker’s authoritative formulation, such 
discrimination could be conceptualized as a taste or preference held 
by employers, fellow workers, or consumers that reduced the demand 
for workers with particular characteristics for reasons unrelated to their 
level of skill. Among employers, a taste for discrimination could prove 
costly, since fi rms that were more narrowly focused on profi t maximiza-
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tion and that were uninhibited by any concerns other than productivity 
should be able to deliver superior performance and outcompete dis-
criminators in the long run. 
Ironically, however, the vast empirical literature based on human 
capital assumptions that quickly proliferated seemed to document rather 
deep and persistent differences in earnings based on race and gender. 
In this sense, its internal logic led to an unintended—or at least unan-
ticipated—direction, away from a tidy legitimization of wage inequal-
ity toward evidence of widespread irrationality (and, one might argue, 
dysfunctionality) in the form of discrimination that might (or might 
not) prove persistent. However, by emphasizing one particular form of 
potential injustice that linked the economic grievances of blacks and 
women, it defl ected attention from wage inequality among white men, 
increasingly pictured as a relatively privileged—because “undiscrimi-
nated” against—component of the labor force. 
In retrospect, the methodological naiveté of early efforts to measure 
discrimination is shocking. Researchers offered up simple regression 
models with earnings on the left-hand side and education and experi-
ence on the right-hand side, along with some standard demographic 
controls, referring to unexplained variance in wages as evidence of 
discrimination, as though no other signifi cant variables could possibly 
have been omitted and no residual was to be expected. Such an estimate 
could be construed as a serious overestimate of discrimination. On the 
other hand, the standard approach also underestimated the effects of 
discrimination by ignoring problems of endogeneity: while earnings 
are clearly infl uenced by education and experience, expected earnings 
also infl uence decisions to invest in education and experience. Many 
women accumulated less experience on the job than men did, for the 
simple reason that they were paid signifi cantly less; thus, they had less 
to gain from it. Had their wages been higher, they would have remained 
employed longer. It was rather disingenuous, then, to explain their 
lower earnings by their lack of experience. The same reasoning applies 
to education: discrimination has the indirect effect of lowering returns 
to education, and therefore reducing incentives to invest in education, 
as well as directly lowering earnings. 
Still, the basic human capital–based earnings equation raised a kind 
of meritocratic standard, implying that earnings should be based on the 
individual worker’s own productive characteristics. In this sense, it was 
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politically consistent with efforts to outlaw explicit discrimination. It 
was also consistent with efforts to improve access to schooling, clearly 
revealed as a major determinant of earnings differences by race and 
ethnicity. Earnings differences by gender were more strongly explained 
by women’s lower level of labor force experience, a fi nding that urged 
women to seek access to higher-paying occupations and improve their 
continuity on the job. 
However simplistic the basic model, it directed economists’ atten-
tion to an aspect of labor supply that had not, until then, received much 
attention: educational attainment. And while Becker’s original theory 
concerned “self-investment” (i.e., the decision by young adults to 
forgo current earnings in order to continue their education beyond high 
school), Becker himself moved rather quickly to acknowledge that fam-
ily decisions to invest in the schooling of young children represented 
an important antecedent. In this sense, his Treatise on the Family repre-
sented a logical extension of Human Capital, and in it he acknowledged 
a signifi cant market failure: parents might lack access to suffi cient cap-
ital to make the optimal investment in their children’s education. In 
a “Supplement to Chapter 11” coauthored with Kevin Murphy on the 
relationship between the family and the state, he suggested that this 
market failure helped explain the emergence of public investment in 
education as part of an intergenerational contract in which the working-
age population would repay their elders by helping fi nance public pen-
sions (Becker 1993, pp. 362–379). 
Looking back on this intellectual trajectory, it almost seems as 
though the internal logic of human capital theory directed it away from 
the utility-maximizing choices of autonomous adults (where it had ini-
tially pointed), in nearly the opposite direction: consideration of the 
consequences of public policies in determining children’s income secu-
rity and access to education. By the early twenty-fi rst century, James 
Heckman, a colleague of Gary Becker at the University of Chicago, had 
begun to make the case that limited access to early childhood education 
means that many students from poor families are unlikely to achieve the 
academic success necessary to attend college, even if it is affordable for 
them. In his words,
Never has the accident of birth mattered more. If I am born to 
educated, supportive parents, my chances of doing well are totally 
different than if I were born to a single parent or abusive parents. I 
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am a University of Chicago libertarian, but this is a case of market 
failure: children don’t get to ‘buy’ their parents, and so there has to 
be some kind of intervention to make up for these environmental 
differences. (Stille 2001, A:5)
This statement doesn’t augur the end of the human capital paradigm, 
but it does signal a major infl ection point, a new emphasis on social 
rather than personal choice. It also points to two theoretical issues that 
were largely undeveloped in the Chicago-school approach to human 
capital—1) externalities or positive spillovers from education and 
2) distributional confl ict over who would pay for them. 
The notion that education generates positive externalities (even 
beyond solving the other market failures alluded to above) strength-
ens the supposition that the social benefi ts exceed the private ones, and 
that public investment yields a rich—if diffuse—payoff. Emphasis on 
such externalities was implicit in the early work of Theodore Schulz on 
the role of human capital in development. It received far more detailed 
theoretical elaboration in theories of endogenous growth developed 
by David Romer and in microeconomic models developed by Daron 
Acemoglu (1996), among others. It has been explored empirically by 
scholars including Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2004).1
 The most important positive spillovers include increases in labor mar-
ket productivity (suggested by the effect of the percentage of college 
graduates in an urban labor market on the earnings of individual grad-
uates), reduced incidence of crime, and improved child health (Hout 
2012). 
Economic historians have also emphasized this positive macroeco-
nomic perspective. Countries that developed successful public edu-
cation systems in the nineteenth century, including the United States, 
enjoyed more sustained and rapid development than those that did not. 
Goldin and Katz (1999) refer to the years from 1900 to 2000 in the 
United States as the “human capital century” and note that the early 
expansion of secondary education was followed by a rapid expansion of 
postsecondary education after World War II, funded both by the expan-
sion of the GI Bill, which provided subsidies for veterans, and by the 
development of a state-fi nanced public higher education system. 
Goldin and Katz (1999) rely largely on the “canonical” Beckerian 
model that emphasizes individual utility maximization, and they fur-
ther assume that technological change has been and will continue to 
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be skill-intensive (Acemoglu and Autor 2012). They focus, as Becker 
himself did in Treatise on the Family, on the extent to which govern-
ment intervention may be required to reduce the capital constraints that 
may prevent parents from making an optimal investment in their chil-
dren’s education. Indeed, they argue that a reduction in public efforts to 
improve educational opportunity helps account for a signifi cant slow-
down in the growth of U.S. high school and college graduate rates in the 
latter decades of the twentieth century. In other words, both individual 
and public choice play an important part in their story. 
The public choice dimension emphasizes the social benefi ts or pub-
lic gains from investments in human capital, and its political implica-
tions resemble those of Keynesian approaches that offered a macro-
economic rationale for redistributing resources from the affl uent to the 
poor in order to increase aggregate demand. The “everybody benefi ts 
from investments in education” rubric suggests that the interests of both 
employers and society in general are closely aligned with the interests 
of forms of redistribution that might improve educational outcomes. 
From this perspective, distributional confl ict is unlikely—or at least 
misplaced—because increased equity in access to education is so likely 
to yield increased economic effi ciency. In ordinary language, taxpayers 
may see their slice of the economic pie reduced by their contributions to 
public provision, but in the long run the pie itself will grow so dramati-
cally that these taxpayers will be more than compensated.
Less theoretical or empirical attention has been devoted to measure-
ment of the actual or perceived costs to increased public investment 
in education, despite the obvious possibility that these costs are likely 
to be disproportionately borne by relatively affl uent families or those 
whose children have already completed the most vital stages of their 
own human capital accumulation. A contemporary illustration is offered 
by the most famous campaign promise made by William de Blasio, the 
mayor of New York City elected in 2014: to impose additional taxes on 
families earning more than $500,000 to fi nance universal early child-
hood education (Hernández 2013).
The historical literature is peppered with observations suggest-
ing that fi scal distributional confl ict comes into play. Those who have 
achieved relatively high levels of affl uence in any form of capital are 
generally reluctant to help fi nance its acquisition by others. Those who 
lack adequate access to education for themselves or their children or 
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grandchildren are generally supportive of increased public investments. 
Cross-national studies show that, in the early twentieth century, the 
greater the percentage of men who voted—all else being equal—the 
higher the level of primary schooling (Lindert 2004, p. 106).
The extended, intense, and ongoing political controversies over 
efforts to equalize per-student spending in primary and secondary 
schools on the state level testify to a distinctly human capital–specifi c 
ingredient in the so-called tax revolt (Folbre 2001). In the United States, 
both primary and secondary schools funded by local taxes generally 
received more generous funding in communities where wealth was 
broadly distributed, with a more homogeneous population (Goldin and 
Katz 1999).
Largely as a result of fi nancing based on local property taxes, the 
United States is one of the few countries that spends more on K–12 edu-
cation for affl uent than for poor children (Porter 2013). The historical 
trajectory of support for publicly funded state universities shows that 
it has been lowest in those states with privately endowed institutions 
already in place to provide a fi ne education to the affl uent (Goldin and 
Katz 2008). 
Racial or ethnic inequalities tend to shape political coalitions that 
determine public investments in human capital. Race-based collective 
action can take an implicit as well as an explicit form: the externalities 
generated by public education represent a public good, and, in general, 
racial and ethnic diversity tend to lower contributions to public-good 
provision (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). As Poterba (1997) famously 
showed, government spending on K–12 education is negatively related 
to the fraction of the population aged 65 and above, especially when 
the fraction of the nonwhite population aged 5–17 and 65 and over is 
included among the controls. More recent research updates this fi nding, 
controlling for the possibility that elderly voters have simply relocated 
toward lower tax communities (Figlio and Fletcher 2012). 
As Daniel Lichter emphasizes in his recent presidential address 
to the Population Association of America, recent demographic trends, 
including faster fertility decline among white non-Hispanic families, 
are increasing the minority share of children—especially compared to 
the predominantly white composition of the population over age 65. 
As of 2013, minorities accounted for the majority of the U.S. popula-
tion under age 1 (Lichter 2013). While increased public investment in 
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education may promise large returns for the United States as a whole, 
it would offer particularly signifi cant benefi ts for blacks and Hispanics, 
possibly undermining racial and ethnic earnings differences that have 
proved remarkably persistent and consistently advantageous for whites. 
The distributional consequences of public investments in education 
are by no means limited to the incidence of taxation or the anticipated 
receipt of direct benefi ts to family members in the form of subsidized 
services. They also include effects of increases in the supply of highly 
educated labor on job opportunities and earnings, especially in cir-
cumstances where human capital “rents”—that is, premiums related to 
excess demand in the face of limited supply—are declining. They may 
also be affected by employers’ projections of the anticipated demand 
for specifi c skills, and the potential for expanded sources of labor sup-
ply outside the United States. 
The human capital intellectual paradigm is sometimes mistakenly 
labeled a purely individualist approach. But while it does emphasize 
self-investment, it clearly acknowledges the role of market failures and 
the need for public provision. A more distinctive feature of the paradigm 
is its optimistic emphasis on convergent interests in which both private 
and public actors benefi t from increased education, because technologi-
cal change voraciously demands ever higher levels of skill. As the next 
section will show, this assumption is misplaced: evidence that we may 
be entering an era of relative oversupply of college-educated workers 
now looms large.   
A BRIEF SUMMARY OF RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
In their magisterial history of the expansion of education in the 
United States, Goldin and Katz (2008) describe a race between educa-
tion and technology that is, effectively, a race between shifts on the 
supply side and the demand side of the market for highly skilled work-
ers. During most of the latter half of the twentieth century, demand 
grew faster than supply, generating signifi cant earnings premiums for 
the college-educated in particular. Hence there arose the “golden age” 
of human capital, one in which individuals willing and able to invest in 
their own productive skills through higher education could be assured 
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of a generous reward, and countries willing and able to develop their 
public higher education systems could capture signifi cant economic 
gains. 
It is worth noting that educators—at every level and in every nook 
and cranny of the education system—stand to gain both psychologically 
and economically from the promise that human capital will always be 
a scarce commodity. Yet today that promise is beginning to seem quite 
shaky. Four stylized facts illustrate the problem: 
 1)  The absolute earnings of college graduates are declining. 
 2)  The college premium—or the earnings of college graduates 
relative to high school graduates—has not increased in recent 
years. 
 3)  College completion rates long ago leveled out for men (though 
not for women). 
 4)  Evidence of mismatch between educational credentials and 
occupational requirements is growing. 
 As Figure 3.1, Panel A, indicates, college-educated women saw 
their median infl ation-adjusted earnings fall after 2002, even though 
their advantage relative to women with only a high-school diploma 
increased. These fi gures understate the downward trend because (for 
the sake of historical continuity) the estimates for college graduates 
include all those with a college degree or higher, and postgraduate 
degrees were richly rewarded over much of this time period. College-
educated men fared even worse in absolute terms, with a median in 
2011 lower than that in 1971. College-educated men experienced a high 
relative premium only because the earnings of men with only high-
school diplomas fell so drastically. The relative earnings premiums for 
both college-educated women and men changed most visibly between 
the early 1980s and the late 1990s and have since evened out. Figure 
3.2 shows that the average annual earnings of all young college gradu-
ates aged 25–34 with a bachelor of arts degree (BA) but no other degree 
began to rise in 2013 but remained lower in 2016 than they were in 
2002.
Many infl uential estimates of the college premium emphasize 
cumulative differences in lifetime earnings (Baum 2014; Baum, Ma, 
and Payea 2013; Carnevale, Rose, and Cheah 2011). But such estimates 
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Figure 3.1  Median Earnings by Education for Young Women and Men
NOTE: Infl ation-adjusted in 2011 $; full-time year-round workers aged 25–34.
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are essentially projections based on the past relationship between edu-
cation and earnings, which may or may not hold over years to come. 
The stock of college-educated Americans is high, which makes 
it diffi cult to see differences in the fl ow over time unless attention is 
focused on the younger cohorts. As Figure 3.3 shows, the percentage 
of young men with a bachelor’s degree or higher leveled off in the 
late 1970s, but it began moving up again in about 2006; over the same 
period the percentage of young women attaining this degree or higher 
increased fairly steadily, albeit at a slower rate after the late 1970s. This 
trend may well refl ect the problems on the supply side—a more het-
erogeneous population, school quality problems, and higher education 
costs—that Goldin and Katz (2008) emphasize. But this highlights the 
public choice problem: why didn’t the business community, or state 
and federal governments, take steps to solve the supply-side problem? 
Perhaps because the demand side was also sagging. 
Figure 3.2  Average Annual Earnings of Individuals Aged 25–34 Working 
Full-Time with Bachelor’s Degree Only (in 2015 $)
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Integrated 
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Evidence of mismatch between education credentials and job 
requirements became apparent even before the Great Recession of 
2007. In 1970, only 1 in 100 taxi drivers and chauffeurs in the United 
States had a college degree, compared to about 15 out of 100 today; 
a similar trend is evident in other occupations such as bartending and 
fi refi ghting (Vedder, Denhart, and Robe 2013). Andrew Sum and Paul 
Harrington of the Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern Uni-
versity estimate that in 2010, fewer than half of all BA holders aged 25 
and below held a job requiring a college degree (Sum 2010).
Unemployment rates may be much lower among college gradu-
ates than others, but they remain high by historic standards. Nor is the 
United States the only country in which a once-privileged sector of the 
labor force fi nds itself at the mercy of the unemployment line. Youth 
unemployment is at record levels in southern Europe, where college 
graduates have been very hard hit. According to a recent article in the 
New York Times, “An estimated 100,000 university graduates have left 
Spain, and hundreds of thousands more from Europe’s crisis-hit coun-
Figure 3.3  Percentage of Men and Women Aged 25–29 with a Bachelor’s 
Degree or Higher
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tries have gone to Germany, Britain, and the Nordic states for jobs in 
engineering, science, and medicine” (Alderman 2013).
The rate of return to a college degree has always varied signifi -
cantly by institution, choice of major, and personal characteristics. 
But a robust demand for the general college credential and for general 
rather than job-specifi c skills once overshadowed these differences, and 
it also reduced the risk to an individual college student of choosing the 
“wrong” major. Today, the variance in rates of return is so high that 
some economists widely regarded as advocates for public investments 
in human capital, such as Isabel Sawhill, warn that not everyone should 
go to college (Owen and Sawhill 2013).
The apparent mismatch between the credentials that colleges and 
universities are supplying and what the labor market is demanding 
could be explained by the poor performance of our institutions of higher 
learning or the self-indulgent choices of students who insist on major-
ing in English or philosophy despite the implications for both personal 
and social returns on investment. Some economists suggest that a col-
lege degree is simply not as good a measure of “skill” as it has been 
in the past (Cowen 2013). Others insist that students who major in sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and math (the so-called STEM fi elds) 
are guaranteed a rosy economic future. On the other hand, a growing 
chorus of voices suggests that even homegrown STEM majors are in 
oversupply (Anft 2013).
One unfortunate legacy of the human capital literature is its ten-
dency to refer to human capital, skill, and educational credentials as 
though they all represent one relatively undifferentiated substance that 
can be easily measured in quantitative terms such as years of education. 
Now it seems apparent that we need to pay more attention to specifi c 
differences in specifi c skill sets needed for specifi c tasks. Our changing 
technological environment has intensifi ed our intellectual division of 
labor, increasing the need for specialization in some areas and decreas-
ing it in others. 
The title of a recent analysis of the impact of information technol-
ogy by Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011) is telling: Race against the 
Machine tells a story rather different from that told by Goldin and Katz 
in The Race between Education and Technology. Education is not racing 
to keep up with technology; rather, individuals are racing to cope with 
their own potential obsolescence. The digital revolution is not increas-
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ing the demand for skill in general but rather offering bigger rewards 
for high skill and lower rewards for what might be termed medium 
skill, bringing about a polarization of demand. Polarization does not 
necessarily imply an overall decline in the demand for college-educated 
workers; one could imagine a scenario in which declining demand for 
medium skill is completely counterbalanced by increasing demand for 
high skill. That is not the scenario they describe. Rather, Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee argue that the overall demand for labor has declined, and 
will likely continue to decline, as a result of information technology. 
The implications for job growth, earnings inequality, and the canoni-
cal human capital model are spelled out in more detail by Acemoglu and 
Autor (2012) in their gently critical review of Goldin and Katz. They 
point to overreliance on the assumption that technological change is 
always skill-intensive, and they emphasize that distinct forms of human 
capital realize their value only in the performance of specifi c tasks. In 
other words, technological change can lower the demand for certain 
types of human capital, which becomes far less productive when dis-
sociated from those tasks. Furthermore, Acemoglu and Autor (here, and 
in other research) offer evidence of a declining demand for “mid-level” 
skills that is almost certainly affecting rates of return to a college degree. 
Further evidence along these lines is offered by Beaudry, Green, 
and Sand (2013), who add a stock/fl ow analysis to the argument, sug-
gesting that burgeoning information technology required large inputs of 
skilled labor but, once a stock of it was put in place, began to require far 
less to maintain itself. They also offer a simple and direct explanation 
for why the college premium remains high despite declining demand 
for college-educated workers, based on a queueing theory of the labor 
market. High-skilled workers go to the head of the employment line, 
accepting lower-level jobs and pushing less-credentialed workers down 
the line or out of the labor force. 
The precise impact of declining demand for college-educated 
workers is diffi cult to measure because shifts in the supply of college-
educated workers on the global level have also been momentous. Digi-
tal outsourcing, facilitated by the very trends in information technology 
that may have affected the demand side of the labor market, is one of 
three major avenues by which global educational trends affect the U.S. 
labor market. The other two are immigration and offshoring, or reloca-
tion of production facilities overseas. 
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The sheer pace of expansion in the global supply of college gradu-
ates—a process that economist Richard Freeman terms “human capital 
leapfrogging”—is astounding. In 2005, Chinese universities awarded 
fi ve times as many bachelor’s degrees as they did in 1999 (Freeman 
2006). Indeed, Freeman reports that the abrupt increase in supply cre-
ated a domestic political crisis in China in 2008, when a large percent-
age of the graduating class—about 20 percent—was unable to fi nd 
employment within a year. In 1970, the United States accounted for 29 
percent of the world’s college students (despite representing only about 
6 percent of the world’s population). By 2005–2006, the U.S. share 
had dropped to 12 percent. Almost 75 percent of global postsecondary 
education enrollments were in developing countries, including China, 
India, and Mexico. 
Much of the expansion in higher education in China and elsewhere 
was driven by national political priorities rather than by individual deci-
sions. The econometric link between private rates of return to educa-
tion and both college graduation and higher degree completion rates is 
not very strong. This fi nding corroborates the Goldin and Katz (2008) 
argument that decreased public spending on higher education (and the 
unequal structure of education funding in general) may have constricted 
the supply of college graduates in the United States in recent years. 
Institutional factors, in other words, have proved quite infl uential com-
pared to individual decisions to “self-invest.” 
At the same time, the fi nding suggests that educational outcomes in 
the United States may matter less for businesses than increased access 
to college graduates and highly trained science and technology PhDs 
from other countries. Discussing trends in immigration to the United 
States, Freeman (2009, p. 21) notes that “the supply of highly able pro-
grammers from India and other developing countries willing to work 
at lower pay than Americans has dampened the growth of supply of 
programmers in the U.S.” Many other economists, including Blinder 
(2006), have emphasized the potential labor market impact of offshor-
ing, noting that it may reduce the demand for highly educated labor and 
put a greater premium on jobs that require face-to-face contact and are 
therefore more diffi cult to relocate. Tonelson (2002, p. 100) argues per-
suasively that “a substantial share of outsourcing-produced job fl ight 
is high-tech job fl ight, and not even the most sophisticated U.S. indus-
tries—and workers—have been exempt.”
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Increased access to global college graduates can infl uence U.S. 
labor market outcomes directly by contributing to slower employment 
and wage growth. But it may also have the indirect effect of reducing 
incentives for the business community to support increased spending on 
public higher education (Folbre 2010). Economists like Richard Vedder 
who are bearish on human capital are already warning of public overin-
vestment in education (Vedder, Denhart, and Robe 2013). As the pros-
pect of a persistent oversupply of college-educated workers begins to 
loom large, the narrow economic rationale for greater collective invest-
ments in human capital begins to weaken. This is perhaps the most omi-
nous signal that the golden age of human capital has come to an end. 
A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
So what? College professors will, of course, feel demoralized by 
lack of enthusiasm for the products they produce. But the potential 
political implications reach much deeper, into the very heart of beliefs 
in a just world and promises of upward mobility for the smart and hard-
working. Getting a college education in the United States will no longer 
be a ticket to ride the train to economic prosperity—and certainly not in 
the fi rst-class compartment. Much recent debate has focused on declin-
ing earnings and opportunities in the middle class, with Acemoglu and 
Autor emphasizing the role of technological change, and Bivens and 
Mishel (2013) placing more blame on political and institutional factors 
that have lowered the bargaining power of wage earners in general.2
But the causes of increased earnings inequality are probably of less 
interest to most Americans than the consequences of diminished 
opportunity. 
The golden age of human capital itself encouraged everyone to 
think more about climbing the ladder than studying its length or posi-
tion. But if the ladder is lifted visibly out of reach, attention is likely 
to shift. One result could be heightened political confl ict, with intensi-
fi ed competition for the fewer rungs remaining within reach. In general, 
periods of economic growth and increased opportunity have tended to 
reduce distributional confl ict. The years between the end of World War 
II and 1970 are sometimes dubbed the golden age of American capital-
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ism for that reason (Marglin and Schor 1990). Alba (2009) has written 
hopefully of a new age of declining racial and ethnic inequality as baby 
boomers retire and create more space for younger workers. However, 
the economic trends described above may outweigh the demographics 
of retirement. Slower economic growth and persistent unemployment 
in Western Europe have fostered a new populist politics there based on 
opposition to immigration and globalization. 
On the other hand, the decline of the professional-managerial class 
concomitant with a reduced payoff to a college degree could lead to 
political realignment. Increased inequality between the top 10 per-
cent and everyone else could be accompanied by decreased inequality 
between those at the 70th percentile and those at the 30th. The middle 
class is declining in size only if it is defi ned in terms of some absolute 
standard. Defi ned instead as the middle four deciles of the income dis-
tribution, its size is fi xed, even if its relative income—and the variance 
of that income—declines. 
Individuals who see no clear path to upward mobility through the 
labor market tend to become less enthusiastic about market forces. 
College-educated workers in the United States may begin to identify 
themselves as members of a working class that is collectively disad-
vantaged by technological change and globalization. As they begin to 
occupy an ever larger share of relatively low-wage jobs, the relative 
college premium may decline, a factor that could diminish racial and 
ethnic inequalities by bringing down the wages of many white workers. 
So the golden age may be over. What comes next? Perhaps the clas-
sical succession of the Ages of Man in Greek mythology, from gold to 
silver to bronze to iron, as chronicled by the poet Hesiod, should be aug-
mented by a new term: silicon. Perhaps, as Isaac Asimov envisioned, 
robots will come to the fore. Human capital will never entirely lose its 
value. In Race against the Machine, Brynjolfsson and McAfee cite a 
1965 National Aeronautic and Space Administration report explaining 
why astronauts were so useful: “Man is the lowest-cost, 150 pound, 
nonlinear, all-purpose computer system that can be mass-produced 
by unskilled labor.” The big question is whether these nonlinear all-
purpose computer systems can work together to confi gure an economic 
system that will treat them as valuable outputs rather than merely as 
useful inputs. That system would invest heavily in human capital what-
ever its private rate of return in the labor market. 
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Notes
The title of this chapter derives from a blog post I wrote for the New York Times Econo-
mix blog on June 10, 2013, which outlined some of the issues raised here. 
 1. Moretti (2005) provides an excellent summary of his research on this topic.
 2. For a readable account of this debate, see Davidson (2013).
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